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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROYAL NORDELL ALLRED, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
MARK E. COOK, BRYANT MADSEN, 
KENNETH R. STRATE and TOM 
MOWER, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 15688 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS COOK, MADSEN, AND STRATE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the former superintendent of 
the North Sanpete School District against three of the five 
members of the North Sanpete School Board. Plaintiff alleged 
in his Complaint that he had been slandered by defendants and 
sought general damages of nearly $400,000 and punitive damages 
of $1,000,000. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After the filing of Plaintiff's complaint all defendants 
filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. On February 24, 1978 the Honor-
able Don V. Tibbs, District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, 
granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss on the grounds that De-
fendant Mower had a constitutional right to participate in the 
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election process of assisting the other defendants to become 
members of the School Board, the publication alleged in Plain-
tiff's complaint did not constitute a slander, and in any 
event, Defendants' statements were privileged and Defendants 
were immune from the action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents seek affirmance of the Order of the 
District Court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since this appeal is based upon the dismissal of Plain-
tiff's complaint this Court must accept the plaintiff's des-
cription of facts alleged in the complaint as true but is not 
required to accept extrinsic facts not plead nor legal conclu-
sions in contradiction to the pleaded facts. Sampson v. Rumsey, 
563 P.2d 506 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977). 
With this principle of appellate review in mind Plaintiff's 
complaint states the following facts: Plaintiff had been the 
Superintendent of Schools of the North Sanpete School District 
and enjoyed an excellent reputation as an effective school ad-
ministrator in his community. Defendants conspired to remove 
Plaintiff from this position and told many people of their de-
sire to do so. Defendants attacked the qualifications of Plain· 
tiff and "in further aid of said scheme and design, the Defen-
dants Cook, Madsen and Strate, with the assistance of the Defen· 
-2-
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dant Mower, sought and obtained election to membership of the 
School Board of the North Sanpete School District." (R., p. 2). 
The first encounter with Plaintiff occurred on May 23, 
1977 when the Defendants Cook, Madsen and Strate spoke with 
Plaintiff in Defendant Strate's car advising him that they 
wished to have his resignation within 24 hours and that if his 
resignation was not forthcoming 27 charges against him would 
be brought out at a public board meeting on May 26, 1977. 
Thereafter, each of the defendants told many persons of 
their claim that 27 charges would be brought out publicly in 
the next meeting and a public outcry resulted. Defendant Strate 
in a town meeting told 40-60 "interested" citizens that Defen-
dants had 27 charges against Plaintiff and invited the people 
to come to the board meeting to see what they were. 
Subsequently, Plaintiff and his attorney and numerous in-
terested citizens sought to determine what these charges were 
but Defendants publicly stated they did not have 27 charges 
against Plaintiff nor any charges against him except "the charge 
of inadequate leadership, in that Plaintiff did not have support 
of the majority of said board." (R., p. 3) • 
In spite of the public disclaimer of these charges Defen-
dants told many persons privately that they had such charges but 
would not bring them out because of possible legal consequences. 
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Defendants mali-
-3-
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ciously and intentionally made statements and encouraged ru-
mors for the purpose of injuring Plaintiff in his employment 
and his professional reputation in the community and that these 
actions were done to diminish Plaintiff's influence and to in-
crease Defendants' own influence over the affairs of the North 
Sanpete School Board. 
Plaintiff stated the following in his complaint: 
Even if said statements and rumors are widely 
disbelieved, some persons will either believe 
them or have doubts whereby Plaintiff is and 
will continue to be disadvantaged in his rela-
tionship with them. Even among those persons 
who do not believe said statements and rumors, 
particularly other professional educators, 
Plaintiff is and will continue to be disad-
vantaged and rendered less effective because 
he has been rendered by said statements and 
rumors "controversial". (R., p. 4). 
Plaintiff further states in his complaint that he cannot 
allege the 27 charges "are false, because he does not know what 
they are". 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted jointly and sever-
ally in their individual capacity but waives any claim against 
the North Sanpete School District. Finally, Plaintiff alleges 
damages of $397,000 plus punitive damages of $1,000,000. 
Plaintiff does not allege any special damages suffered as 
a result of the alleged slander. He does not allege in his com· 
plaint that Defendants Cook, Madsen, and Strate did not have 
the power as a school board to terminate his employment or to 
exercise control over his employment. He does not claim Defen-
-4-
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dants were acting beyond their official capacity at the time 
of the alleged slander. 
Based upon this complaint the trial court found as to De-
fendants Cook, Madsen, and Strate that an actionable slander 
had not been stated, that any statements made by the defendants 
were privileged, and that the school board members were immune. 
It is from this order that this appeal is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A 
CLAIM OF ACTIONABLE SLANDER. 
Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Claim of Slander Per 
Se or Slander Per Quod. 
Defamatory words are either actionable per se or per quod. 
Those which are injurious upon their face and without extrinsic 
aid are defamatory per se; but if insinuations, innuendoes, col-
loquium or explanatory circumstances are necessary either to 
explain the person intended or the defamatory character, they 
are only actionable per quod and require pleadings and proof of 
special damages to the complaining party. Ramsey v. Zeigner, 
444 P.2d 968 (N.M. 1968). 
Since Plaintiff has made no allegation of special damages 
resulting from the alleged libelous statements the ruling of 
the trial court must be upheld unless it is assumed, as a mat-
ter of law, that the alleged statements made by Defendants con-
-5-
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stituted slander per se. Western States Title Insurance Com-
pany v. warnock, 415 P.2d 316 (Utah 1966). 
For words to be libelous per se their injurious character 
must be a fact of such common notoriety as to be established 
by the common consent of men so that damage from the publica-
tion of such words may be presumed. Nichols v. Daily Reporter 
££·• 30 Utah 74, 83 P. 573 (1902). 
It is generally recognized that per se defamation results 
from words imputing a matter incompatible with a person's busi-
ness, trade or profession or a criminal offense. Restatement 
Cf the Law, 2d, Torts, Section 570. 
Section 573 of the Restatement of Torts states that one 
who publishes a slander that ascribes to another conduct, 
characteristics or a condition that would adversely affect his 
fitness for the conduct of his trade or profession is subject 
to liability without proof of special harm. This section is 
clear, however, that any alleged slanderous remarks must be spe-
cifically directed to the qualities necessary for the person's 
profession and not general defamatory remarks. The Comment to 
this section gives an example of this difference: 
A statement that a physician consorts with 
harlots is not actionable per se, although a 
charge that he makes improper advances to 
his patients is actionable; the one statement 
does not affect his reputation as a physician 
whereas the other does so affect it. Id. at 
p. 194. 
In Beatty v. Errings, 173 N.W.2d 12 (Minn. 1969) a lawyer 
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brought an action against various defendants who, among other 
things, called him a liar and a man needing psychiatric help. 
The court in that case held that such charges did not directly 
attack the plaintiff's professional ability but were general 
attacks upon the plaintiff himself and that therefore special 
damages had to be proven. 
Section 571 of the Restatement of Torts provides defama-
tion is per se if it charges a crime which is punishable by im-
prisonment or which is regarded by public opinion as involving 
moral turpitude. 
Plaintiff argues in his brief that the "obvious" inference 
from the alleged statement of 27 charges is that Plaintiff was 
to be charged with 27 criminal offenses or at the least that 
Plaintiff had been deficient in the conduct of his office. 
(Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7). 
It is precisely this problem of "inference" which makes 
the alleged statements of Defendants, at best, to be defamation 
per quod. It is a well-settled rule of law that in evaluating 
a statement alleged to be libelous per se, the trial court must 
interpret the statement alone, without the aid of inducements, 
colloquialisms, innuendoes, or explanatory circumstances. The 
publication must contain defamatory words specifically directed 
at the person claiming injury, which words, on their face, and 
without the aid of intrinsic proof, be unmistakably recognized 
as injurious. Words which require an innuendo are not libelous 
-7-
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per se. Paris v. Division of State Compensation Fund, 517 P.2d 
1353 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Ramsey v. Zeigner, 444 P.2d 968 
(N.M. 1968). 
It is impossible to know from this general language of "27 
charges" whether any of the charges would involve an attack 
upon the professional competency of the plaintiff or would charge 
him with a crime involving imprisonment or moral turpitude. It 
is just as easy to assume that the attacks were upon Plaintiff's 
personal characteristics or criminal charges not involving fe-
lonies or a breach of morality. Thus, Plaintiff argues that 
when an unknown charge is made against a person it must be as-
sumed that a per se defamation has occurred and that no showing 
of special damages is necessary. Defendants urge that this as-
sertion is incorrect and that in a case such as this involving 
a general innuendo if any defamation is to be presumed it should 
be presumed to have been per quod requiring the showing of spe-
cial damages. To hold otherwise gives the plaintiff the advan-
tage of not having to prove special damages while at the same 
time having no clearly slanderous statements made against him. 
Finally, it is doubtful that the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of Plaintiff's complaint give rise to a claim 
for damages under either per se or per quod defamation. These 
paragraphs imply that Plaintiff's future employment may somehow 
be harmed because of the statements made by Defendants. It is 
clear, however, that words which are only possibly injurious 
-8-
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to some vague new future employment will not give rise to a 
cause of action under either per se or per quod defamation. 
Gibson v. Kincaid, 221 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. App. Ct. 1967). 
For these reasons the trial court was correct in holding 
that the statements alleged to have been made by the defendant 
school board members did not amount to a publication of an ac-
tionable slander or libel. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING DE-
FENDANTS' ACTIONS TO BE PRIVILEGED. 
A. The Defendants have an Absolute Privilege to Make 
Statements Concerning Plaintiff's Employment. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges several occasions of slander. 
First, Plaintiff complains that he was told by the defendants 
that he should resign or charges would result against him with-
in 24 hours. (R., p. 2). It was obvious, however, that the 
communication by Defendants with Plaintiff himself is not an 
actionable slander since there was no publication to third par-
ties. Lenz v. Neuman, 290 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1955). 
Second, Plaintiff complains that Defendants told interested 
citizens that the defendants had 27 charges against the superin-
tendent and that these charges would be made at a board meeting. 
Next, Plaintiff admits that these charges were never made 
at the board meeting and, in fact, that Defendants stated they 
did not have charges against him except that he did not have the 
support of the majority of the school board. Finally, Plaintiff 
-9-
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alleges that in spite of this public disclaimer of said char-
ges Defendants told other persons privately that while there 
were actual charges against Plaintiff they would not be brought 
out because of legal consequences. 
Assuming these allegations to be true, Plaintiff has not 
complained of anything other than instances where three mem-
bers of the school board made statements concerning Plaintiff's 
conduct as an employee of the school district. 
There can be no doubt that Title 53, Chapter 6 of the Utah 
Code Annotated empowers the school board to directly control 
the actions of the superintendent of schools including his ap-
pointment and removal. Section 53-6-7 specifically allows the 
board of education to remove an appointed or elected officer 
from office for cause by a vote of two-thirds of the board. 
Section 53-6-11 provides that a superintendent of schools shall 
be appointed for a two-year period until his successor shall be 
appointed and has qualified. 
Since it is unknown from Plaintiff's complaint the identity 
of the "interested" persons to whom the defendants allegedly 
spoke, it can be assumed that these persons were other members 
of the school board, the school board staff, or parents having 
children in the school district. 
Thus, any statements made concerning Plaintiff's employment 
or his conduct constituted an essential duty of the school 
board--in this instance consisting of a majority of the three 
-10-
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defendants. 
Section 45-2-3 provides that a privileged publication or 
broadcast shall not be considered as libelous or slanderous 
per se if it is made in the proper discharge of an official 
duty. It is generally held that public officials who act in an 
official capacity are absolutely privileged to make any state-
rnent, whether slanderous or not, provided the statements are 
made or the actions are taken in the course of the official 
duties or powers and within the scope of the official's author-
ity. Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 140 A.2d 100 (Penn. 
1958) • 
Absolute privilege is in contrast to qualified or condi-
tional privilege which merely rebuts the inference of malice 
that is imputed in the absence of privilege, and conditions 
recovery on a showing of falsity or actual malice. 50 Am.Jur.2d, 
Libel and Slander, Section 195. 
The policy reasons behind the doctrine of absolute privi-
lege were well stated by Justice Learned Hand who said: 
[A]n official, who is in fact guilty of 
using his powers to vent his spleen upon 
others ••• should not escape liability for 
the injuries he may so cause; and, if it 
were possible in practice to confine such 
complaints to the guilty, it would be mon-
strous to deny recovery •••• [But] it is 
impossible to know whether the claim is 
well-founded until the case has been tried, 
and ••• to submit all officials, the inno-
cent as well as the guilty, to the burden 
of a trial and to the inevitable darnger of 
its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all 
-11-
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but the most resolute, or the most irre-
sponsible, in the unflinching discharge of 
their duties. Again and again the public 
interest calls for action which may turn 
out to be founded on a mistake, in the face 
of which an official may later find himself 
hardput to it to satisfy a jury of his good 
faith •••• In this instance it has been 
thought in the end better to leave unre-
dressed the wrongs done by dishonest offi-
cers than to subject those who try to do 
their duty to the constant dread of retal-
iation. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 
581 (2nd Cir. 1949). 
This Court on two occasions has held that an absolute pri-
vilege attaches to official proceedings. In Carter v. Jackson, 
351 P.2d 957, 10 Utah 2d 284 (1960) an action for slander was 
undertaken against a city council member by a deputy city mar-
shall who claimed defamation had occurred during a city coun-
cil meeting. Th~s Court stated: 
The statement of the defendant was made in 
his official capacity in an official pro-
ceeding authorized by law and it had a rea-
sonable relationship to the subject of the 
meeting. The statement, therefore, was 
absolutely privileged. Id. at 958. 
See also Dodge v. Henriod, 444 P.2d 753 (Utah 1968) (Statement 
made in the course of a judicial proceeding and in discharge of 
an official duty absolutely privileged). 
Plaintiff has not in his complaint alleged that the state-
ments made by Defendants were not made in an official capacity 
nor in official proceedings. For example, the Spring City town 
meeting in which Defendant Strate allegedly made the defamatocy 
statements could certainly be said to be an official function 
-12-
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of a member of a school board and that he was speaking on be-
half of the school board at that time. 
Cases in other jurisdictions clearly hold that members 
of a state school board or equivalent authority are absolutely 
privileged in the investigation and handling of employment mat-
ters. 
In Lombardo v. Stoke, 276 N.Y.S. 97 (Ct. App. N.Y.) a 
suit was brought by two members of a college against the New 
York City Board of Higher Education which had released infor-
mation to the press and to the public concerning the hiring 
practices of the university. The court in that case stated: 
In the case before us, the Board of Higher 
Education, is undoubtedly an "important 
agency" of municipal government •••• We 
have previously recognized that making 
the official statements of some government 
executives absolutely privileged is "essen-
tial in the conduct of official business". 
In our view, the members of the defendant 
Board of Higher Education are such execu-
tives and they should be free to report to 
the public on appropriate occasions "with-
out fear or reprisal by civil suit for dam-
ages". Id. at 101. 
Likewise, in Laurence University v. State, 344 N.Y.S.2d 
183 N.Y. App. Div. (1973) the court held that the Commissioner 
of Education who under New York law possessed broad and compre-
hensive powers to enforce all laws relating to the educational 
system and to execute all policies determined by the Board of 
Regents had the right and duty to concern himself with the qual-
ity of any faculty under his supervision together with its 
_,._ 
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higher educational pursuits to the extent that those pursuits 
added to or detracted from the quality of performance. The 
court concluded that the commissioner had authority to make 
qualitative comments to other college presidents, superinten-
dents and other institutions he deemed appropriate. 
In Roberts v. Lenfestey, 264 So.2d 449 (Fla. App. 1972) 
the plaintiff was an applicant for a teaching position at a 
junior college. During the course of negotiations the defen-
dant, the chief executive officer of the college in charge of 
hiring, made allegedly derogatory statements against the plain-
tiff. The court, in upholding the absolute privilege of the 
administrator, stated that under our democratic system the 
stewardship of public officials is daily observed by the pu-
blic. "It is necessary that free and open explanations of their 
actions be made." Id. at 451. 
In McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 253 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 1969), the 
superintendent had told the board of education that the plain-
tiffs' teaching was poor, that they left their rooms unatten-
ded, and they in general lacked ability as teachers. In affir-
ming the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, the Illinois 
Supreme Court noted that the duties of the superintendent in-
cluded making recommendations concerning teachers and concluded 
that any such statements were absolutely privileged. 
In Smith v. Helbraun, 251 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. 1964), it was 
held that the members of the board of education had an absolute 
-lil_ 
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privilege where, in a resolution adopted by the Board, it was 
stated in effect that greater progress could be made in solv-
ing educational problems of the district under new leadership 
and that the presence of the plaintiff superintendent of schools 
of the district was detrimental to the best interests of the 
school district and to the education of the children. The 
court pointed out that the members of the board of education 
had wide executive and administrative powers in the management 
and control of the educational affairs and other interests 
within the responsibility of the board and that in executing 
their duties the members of the board performed a state func-
tion of high importance to the people and to the district and 
that they were thus clothed with an absolute privilege and that 
since the resolution complained of concerned the continued ser-
vice of the superintendent of schools, a subject clearly within 
the purview of the board of education, the statement of the 
board by resolution was absolutely privileged. 
See also Williams v. School District, 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 
1969), where a superintendent's comments to the board about a 
school teacher were held absolutely privileged; and Brewbaker 
v. Board of Education, 502 F.2d 973 (Ca. 7). See also Martin 
v. Kearney, 51 Cal. App.3d 309, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281, where it 
was held that a parents' letter to principal charging a teacher 
with lack of judgment, rudeness, etc., was a publication within 
the meaning of a statute establishing absolute privilege with 
-15-
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regard to communications between interested persons. 
Other cases concerning officials not directly involved 
with education are analogous. In Schlinkert v. Henderson, 49 
N.W.2d 180 (Mich. 1951) a letter written by a member of the 
State Liquor Control Commission recommending rejection of an 
executive director because he was not fit by temperament, ca-
pacity or experience for such a position was absolutely pri-
vileged as an official act within the scope of the writer's 
duty and in the public interest. The appellate court affirmed 
the lower court's dismissal of the action. 
In Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 140 A.2d 100 (Penn. 
1958) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the dismissal 
of plaintiff's complaint in which it was alleged that a govern-
ment official had made defamatory statements to the press con-
cerning a contractor's quality of work. The court held that 
the public official was justified in making statements to the 
public and the press concerning the quality of the plaintiff's 
work since it involved an important interest of public concern. 
~ also Saxon v. Knowles, 185 So.2d 194 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1966) (appellate court upholding trial court's dismissal with 
prejudice of complaint alleging that city manager had malicious-
ly and falsely slandered plaintiff's business reputation by pu-
blic and newspaper statements); Ascherman v. Natanson, 100 Cal. 
Rep. 656 Cal. (Ct. App. 1972) (absolute privilege attached to 
hospital officials engaged in investigation and hearing of mat-
-16-
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ter delegated to them) • 
In the present case, an absolute privilege attached to 
any statements of the defendants and that privilege may not be 
overcome except by a showing in Plaintiff's complaint that the 
statements were not made within the scope of the official du-
ties. The fact that the defendants had a statutory right to 
make such statements is clear when one reads Utah Code Annota-
ted, Section 53-6-20 which allows a member of the board of edu-
cation to "do all things needful for the maintenance, pros-
perity and success of the schools and the promotion of educa-
tion" and Section 53-6-11 which governs the appointment of 
superintendent of schools. In addition, Section 53-4-14 allows 
a school board to terminate a contract of employment for cause 
at any time. 
Appellant attempts to distinguish the defendants' official 
duties by citing the Orderly School Termination Procedure Act 
and arguing that under such act Plaintiff was entitled to sixty 
days notice of termination of employment which had not been re-
ceived. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11). He argues that Defen-
dants, acting as a majority of the school board, had no right to 
terminate Plaintiff at the end of the June period and that any 
inquiry or charges for his resignation were not "official". 
It must be noted that Plaintiff's statement concerning the 
two-month period and the failure to give notice is not contained 
in the pleadings and cannot be considered in a motion to dis-
-17-
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miss. In addition to this fact, it is questionable whether 
the Orderly School Termination Procedure Act applies to super-
intendents because of the inconsistencies in the statute it-
self--for example, the heading of the act is "Teacher's Ter-
mination Procedures"--and because superintendents are the di-
rect agent of the school board and have never enjoyed tenure 
privileges. 
As stated by the Wyoming Supreme Court: 
The legislature may wish at some future 
time to bring superintendents within the 
application of tenure provisions. But, 
on the other hand, there are reasons why 
it may not wish to do so. As represen-
tatives of the people, the Board of Edu-
cation is the body charged with the pri-
mary responsibility in forming educa-
tional policy and supervising school ad-
ministration. In order for the Board to 
discharge these responsibilities and be 
responsive to the wishes of the elec-
torate, it would seem essential that they 
have the right to choose, in their dis-
cretion, the district's chief executive 
officer. Otherwise, the Board would have 
duties but would lack the necessary means 
of fulfilling them. Seyfang v. Board of 
Trustees, 563 P.2d 1376 (Wyo. 1977). 
Plaintiff also argues that the charges and inquiries al-
legedly made by the defendant school board members could not 
have been germane to dismissal for cause since "They did not 
have the two-thirds majority of the board required to do so." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 11). This too is an unplead assumption 
which assumes that the other two school board members would 
never have voted for the plaintiff's dismissal regardless of 
-18-
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the charges made. 
In any event, however, Plaintiff in his complaint does 
not allege that Defendants were acting beyond their official 
power and duties nor that they had no ability to dismiss Plain-
tiff as the superintendent. For these reasons, since it must 
be assumed as a matter of law that defendant school board mem-
bers were acting in their official capacity they must be given 
absolute privilege in any statements they allegedly made. 
B. Defendants' Statements Were Conditionally Privileged. 
Assuming arguendo that the alleged statements made by De-
fendants were not absolutely privileged as discussed in the 
preceding section there can be no question they would be enti-
tled to a conditional or qualified privilege. 
A conditional privilege protects the speaker from defama-
tion suits except as to those occasions when the speaker makes 
false defamatory statements which either (a) he in fact does 
not believe to be true or (b) has no reasonable grounds for be-
lieving to be true. Gardner v. Harrifield, 549 P.2d 266 (Ida. 
1976). 
In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
held that people such as Plaintiff who are in public positions 
assume the role of a public figure and that such a person can-
not recover for defamatory falsehoods relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual 
malice--with knowledge that it was false or with reckless dis-
-1Q-
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regard of whether it was false or not. Curtis Publishing Com-
pany v. Butts, 388 u.s. 130 (1967). 
To defeat that privilege, it is encurnbent upon a plain-
tiff to plead and prove, as to each statement, that the state-
ment was false and that it was written or spoken "with know-
ledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not". Beatty v. Ellings, 173 N.W.2d 12 (Minn. 
1969). 
The court in the Beatty case noted that Plaintiff's alle-
gation that defamatory words were "maliciously" spoken was not 
a sufficient pleading of constitutional malice. The court 
noted that mere proof of personal ill will does not meet the 
constitutional standard of actual malice. 
In Utah, Sect~on 76-9-506 presumes that communications 
between interested persons is not malicious. That section 
states: 
Communication made to a person interested 
in the communication by one who is also in-
terested, or who stands in a relation to the 
former as to afford a reasonable ground for 
supposing his motive innocent, is not pre-
sumed to be malicious, and is a privileged 
communication. 
See also Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (1935). 
The plaintiff in his complaint states, "Defendants and each 
of them made such statements and caused and encouraged said ru-
rnors intentionally, deliberately, maliciously, and recklessly 
for the purpose of injuring Plaintiff in his employment". (R., 
-20-
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p. 4). Aside from this bare assertion there is nothing in the 
complaint that shows any more than ill will between Defendants 
and Plaintiff. 
The court in Williams v. The School District of Spring-
field, 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969) in upholding the dismissal 
of the plaintiff's complaint stated: 
The allegation that Respondent Graff's 
exercise of the ministerial duties was 
done in a "wanton, reckless and malicious" 
manner are mere conclusions not substan-
tiated by any facts pleaded by appellant 
and therefore not admitted by the motion 
to dismiss. Id. at 266. 
Similarly, in Dean v. Chapman, 556 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1976) the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in affirming the lower court's dis-
missal of Plaintiff's complain~ held that the complaint char-
ging Defendants' conduct was reckless, willful, wanton, malicious, 
unlawful and grossly negligent was not sufficient to allege rna-
lice when there were no evidentiary facts plead in the com-
plaint to support the legal conclusion of maliciousness. 
This Court in Anderson v. Granite School District, 413 P.2d 
597 (Utah 1966) applied this principle in affirming the lower 
court's order of dismissal in which claims of malicious actions 
on the part of Defendants were made. This Court stated: 
Except for the allegations in the plain-
tiff's complaint that the defendants acted 
maliciously and outside of their authority 
in interfering with their ditch, there is 
nothing whatsoever to indicate that such 
was the fact. Id. at 599. 
-21-
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~~Sampson v. Rumsey, 563 P.2d 506 (Kan. 1977) (A court 
is not required, on a motion to dismiss, to accept as true 
conclusionary allegations as to the legal effect of facts set 
out, if these allegations do not reasonably follow from the 
description of what happened or if these allegations are con-
tradicted by the description itself). 
With this principle in mind Plaintiff's complaint fails 
to show any facts upon which malice can be based. Paragraph 2 
of the complaint states that Defendants desired to remove 
Plaintiff from his position as superintendent of the school 
district because they did not think he possessed sufficient 
character and qualifications. Any citizen is entitled to at-
tempt to remove any official not qualified for his job and such 
action cannot, alone, constitute malice. Defendants, however, 
were more than just citizens; they constituted a majority of 
the board of education and were thus entitled to remove the su-
perintendent. 
Paragraph 3 of the complaint alleges that the defendants 
stated to Plaintiff that he had interfered with them for the 
last time and that they wanted his resignation. If such resig-
nation did not come Defendants allegedly said they would publi-
cize 27 charges against him. Once again, however, Defendants 
were Plaintiff's immediate supervisors and could certainly ask 
for his resignation without having any vindictive or malicious 
motives. 
-22-
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Paragraph 4 of the complaint states that Defendants told 
interested citizens that 27 charges would be brought out pu-
blicly in the next board meeting. Again, such a statement to 
"interested" persons does not show a malicious motive on the 
part of the defendants but only a desire to allow public infor-
mation and comment concerning the employment controversy. 
Paragraph 5 alleges that the defendants denied having any 
charges against Plaintiff except his ability to receive the 
support of the board. Certainly there is no malice in such an 
allegation. 
Paragraph 6 alleges that Defendants told other persons 
privately that there were charges but they would not be brought 
out because of the possible legal consequences. Assuming this 
fact to be true, Defendants' decision not to publicize the 
charges was not malicious nor can it be presumed that this 
decision to retract previous statements was made to harm Plain-
tiff--rather than vindicating him. 
Even giving Plaintiff the benefit of all doubts and as-
suming all of his allegations are correct, there is nothing 
which shows that the statements concerning the 27 charges were 
made by the defendants with a motive other than their desire 
for Plaintiff to resign. Since Plaintiff himself does not know 
whether or not the charges were true as alleged in paragraph 
9 of his complaint, Plaintiff cannot say that they were unfoun-
ded nor maliciously formulated. 
-23-
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The ill will obviously present between the parties in 
this case does not constitute the actual malice necessary to 
eliminate a conditional privilege. Defendants' decision, pre-
surning that such charges existed, not to pursue the charges 
was inferentially done upon legal advice and in the discretion 
of the board. Defendants had no duty to publicize these char-
ges so that Plaintiff could deny them. And while it may have 
been poor judgment on the part of the board to decline to 
discuss the charges any further with the "interested persons", 
the board's decision does not amount to the actual malice ne-
cessary in order to eliminate a conditional privilege. 
For these reasons, therefore, even if it is assumed that 
the board did not have an absolute privilege, they are entitled 
to a conditional privilege since Plaintiff is unable to show 
sufficient facts to justify his allegation of malice. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE IN AN ACTION FOR 
SLANDER. 
In addition to the absolute and conditional privilege avail· 
able to public officials in defamation cases only, there exists 
the general immunity provisions applicable to all governmental 
employees. Section 63-30-2 of the Governmental Immunity Act 
provides that a school district is a political subdivision and 
a governmental entity within the meaning of the Act. Section 3 
of the Act provides that except as otherwise provided, govern-
-24-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mental entities are immune from suit for any injury which may 
result from the activities of the entity wherein the entity 
is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental 
function. Section 63-30-10 provides that immunity from suit 
of governmental entities is waived for injury caused by a ne-
gligent act or omission of an employee except if the injury 
"arises out of ••. libel, slander". 
After the passage of the Governmental Immunity Act, the 
legislature adopted the Public Employees Indemnification Act, 
Title 63, Chapter 48, Utah Code Annotated. That Act provides that 
suits against governmental employees arising out of acts occur-
ring during the performance of their duties, within the scope 
of employment or under color of authority, must be defended by 
the governmental entity. The entity is required to pay any 
judgment that is rendered against the employee. There is an 
exception if the acts giving rise to the suit are due tc the 
gross negligence, fraud or malice. The statute further elimi-
nates the right of the entity to common law indemnification 
from the employee. 
The legislature also has made it perfectly clear that a 
government employee is protected from personal liability while 
acting in his official duty unless he acted through gross negli-
gence, fraud or malice. The 1978 Amendment to the Governmental 
Immunity Act evidences this intent. Section 63-30-4, U.C.A. 
(Supp. 1978). 
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While the plaintiff's complaint purports to assert a 
claim against the defendants in their individual capacity only, 
such a statement in the complaint does not make it so; in fact, 
it is obvious that the actions of the defendants were under-
taken solely because of their respective positions as members 
of the board of education. Since they were acting within the 
scope of their duties as provided by statute, that is, hiring, 
firing, or forcing the resignation of a superintendent, they 
are clearly entitled to tender the defense of this action to 
the school district and the school district will ultimately 
be required to defend and indemnify. Thus, the school district 
would be ultimately liable but for that provision of the Im-
munity Act which retains immunity for actions for libel and 
slander. Under these circumstances, the individual employees 
of the governmental entity share any immunity which the entity 
would otherwise have. 
In Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P.626 (1913), the 
plaintiff's land was damaged by the overflowing of a state ca-
nal. Plaintiff claimed that even if the state and State Board 
of Land Commissioners were immune from suit, the individual 
commissioners could be held liable. In reversing a judgment 
for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held: 
It is idle to contend that an action is 
not against the state when it and no one 
else is held responsible, and its funds 
are directed to be appropriated in satis-
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faction of the judgment without even-a right 
to recoup its loss. To say that under such 
circumstances the action is merely against 
state officials or state agencies is to ig-
nore the very essence of things. 42 Utah at 
492, 134 P. at 630. 
Similarly, in Anderson Investment Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 
2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 (1972), suit was brought against the in-
dividual members of the State Road Commission. The trial court 
dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the court stated: 
These members in the performance of their 
duties have the same immunity as does the 
commission which they constitute. 28 Utah 
2d at 381, 503 P.2d at 146. 
In Roosendaal Construction and Mining Corp. v. Holman, 28 
Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972), Plaintiff sued the state, the 
Tax Commission and one of its agents. In affirming the dis-
missal of the complaint it was specifically held: 
As to the plaintiff's claim for damages it 
must proceed, if at all, pursuant to the 
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30, u.c.A. 
(1953), known as the Governmental Immunity 
Act. A prerequisite in pursuing a claim 
against the state or its officers is a com-
pliance with Section 63-30-12 [the notice 
provision] ••• 
It appears that the plaintiff's complaint 
is fatally defective in that it does not al-
lege compliance with that section. (Empha-
sis added). 28 Utah 2d at 398-399, 503 P.2d 
at 448. 
The logic of these cases is clear. If a suit, although 
nominally against an individual, is in reality and substance a 
suit against a governmental entity, then the procedures, ex-
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ceptions and limitations that apply to the governmental entity 
must apply to the suit against the individual. 
The same position has been also adopted by the highest 
courts of other states, e.g., Schreder v. Veatch, 337 P.2d 814 
(Ore. 1959); State Highway Comm. v. Green-Boots Const. Co., 
187 P.2d 209 (Okla. 1947). 
Thus, the defendants are immune not only because the en-
tity of which they are officers is immune, but also because 
the plaintiff has failed to comply with or to allege compliance 
with the appropriate provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
There is no allegation in Plaintiff's complaint that the 
three defendants were not acting in official capacities as mem-
bers of the North Sanpete School Board. There is also no alle-
gation showing that their actions in confronting Plaintiff were 
not done in good faith on their honest belief that Plaintiff 
was not qualified to hold the office. Absent a pleading of 
facts showing actual, malicious, and evil motive of the conduct 
of Defendants the Governmental Immunity Act protects these indi-
viduals from a suit of this nature. 
In Anderson v. Granite School District, 413 P.2d 597 (Utah 
1966) the court stated the rule as follows: 
It is a little difficult for us to re-
gard in a serious light the plaintiffs' 
asserted claim for $80,000 punitive dam-
ages against the defendant School Board 
members individually. In common with 
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other public officials, they have author-
ity to do whatever is reasonably neces-
sary in carrying out the duties imposed 
upon them. It would be quite impractical 
and unfair to require them to act at their 
own risk. This would not only be disrup-
tive of the proper functioning of public 
institutions, but undoubtedly would dis-
suade competent and responsible persons 
from accepting the responsibilities of pu-
blic office. Accordingly, it is the set-
tled policy of the law that when a public 
official acts in good faith, believing 
what he does to be within the scope of his 
authority and in the line of his duty, he 
is not liable for damages even if he makes 
a mistake in the exercise of his judgment. 
Id. at 599. 
Aside from Plaintiff's conclusionary statement in the complaint 
that the action of Defendants was done maliciously there is 
nothing in the factual context of the complaint which shows 
bad faith on the part of the defendants or their belief they 
were not acting on behalf of the school board. 
Even this Court's recent decision of Cornwall v. Larsen, 
571 P.2d 925 (1977) does not affect the immunity in this case 
since Defendants were exercising discretionary powers--not 
ministerial--at the time of the alleged slander and, further-
more, were not in violation of any specific statute as was the 
police officer in Cornwall. 
Therefore, the trial court was correct in finding immunity 
on behalf of the defendants through the Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants' alleged statements concerning the "27 char-
ges" do not amount to a slander per se. It would be impossible 
for a listener of such a statement to know what kind of charge 
was being made by the defendants and only by innuendoes could 
any derogatory fact concerning Plaintiff's profession be found. 
At most, the "27 charges" statements are libel per quod in that 
they are general allegations which may or may not have gone to 
the professional competence of the plaintiff. As such, there-
fore, it was necessary for the plaintiff to plead actual dam-
ages if he was to sustain his burden during the motion to dis-
miss. 
Even assuming arguendo that a slander was made, the de-
fendants are absolutely privileged from any statements they made 
when acting in their official capacity regardless of their mo-
tive or intentions. This rule has been developed especially 
to protect government officials from the "catch-all" tort of 
slander and libel and protects government officials and officers 
from a myriad of lawsuits which could result from public state-
ments or public actions concerning individuals. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that an absolute 
privilege did not attach to Defendants with regard to slander 
there can be no dispute that a conditional privilege attached. 
This privilege could only be lost in the showing of actual malice 
as defined by the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiff's com-
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plaint while making conclusionary statements of malice did not 
allege sufficient facts to justify such a conclusion. 
Finally, regardless of the special area of slander irnmun-
ity provided to officials in the form of absolute privilege 
and conditional privilege, Defendants are entitled to the pro-
tection of the Governmental Immunity Act applicable to all ern-
ployees as they acted in their official duties and in good 
faith. There is no showing in Plaintiff's complaint that De-
fendants did not act in their capacity as members of the school 
board with the function of supervising and administering the 
employees of the district or that their actions and statements 
were not made in good faith for the benefit of the school sys-
tern. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court dis-
missing Plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August, 1978. 
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